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DISCRETIONARY WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES AN] THE FOuRTH AMENDMENT: A NEED

FOR CLEARER GUIDELINES
I.

INTRODUCTION

In November 2000, the United States Supreme Court examined the
constitutionality of a city's drug interdiction checkpoint program in City of
Indianapolisv. Edmond. The Court held that the program's secondary purposes of
keeping impaired motorists off the road and verifying licenses and registrations
could not justify a warrantless stop the primary purpose of which was to detect
narcotics.2 However, in Atwater v. City ofLago Vista,3 decided just five months
later, the Court held that a police officer could arrest a motorist for a fine-only
misdemeanor without violating the motorist's Fourth Amendment rights.4
This Comment argues that the theories behind these two recent cases are in
conflict. InEdmond,the Court prohibited the police from discretionarily using their
regulatory authority to investigate individuals for narcotics possession.5 By contrast,
inAtwater the Court held that the police officer was allowed to use his discretionary
regulatory authority to arrest a motorist for a violation of a traffic law and that this
warrantless arrest gave him the authority to conduct an investigatory search of the
motorist's vehicle.6
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of the cases that have addressed
the constitutionality ofwarrantless searches and seizures and discusses the relevant
facts of Edmond andAtwater.Part IlI analyzes the contradictions betweenEdmond
and Atwater in light of prior warrantless search and seizure cases. Part III also
discusses the treatment of traffic violations as criminal offenses, the policy ofpolice
discretion, and the wisdom of creating a bright-line rule for police officers to follow
in warrantless search and seizure situations. Finally, Part IV emphasizes the need
for state legislation to set forth the proper procedures for police officers to follow
and proposes legislative solutions to promote consistency, precision, and
predictability in future search and seizure cases.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

531 U.S. 32 (2000).
Id. at 48.
532 U.S. 318 (2001).
Id. at 323-24, 354.
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47-48.
Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354-55; see infra Part II.B.3.
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II. BACKGROUND

A. FourthAmendment
The Fourth Amendment grants individuals a general constitutional right to
privacy and protects against inappropriate government intrusion.7 The Fourth
Amendment states as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supportedby Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.8
The test most frequently cited to determine whether an individual's Fourth
Amendment rights have been violated originated in Justice Harlan's concurring
opinion in Katz v. United States.9 The test requires "first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" Cases
following Katz have used this test to determine if the Fourth Amendment was
violated."
B. Exceptions to the Rule
1. Automobile Exception
Cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment state that a government search or
seizure of a person, a person's home, or a person's effects without a warrant is
unreasonable unless it falls within one of the exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment.'2 The United States Supreme Court has recognized a distinction

7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
8. Id.
9. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). The majority reasoned that the Fourth
Amendment did not protect information that a person knowingly exposed to the public, but what a
person kept private, even in a public place, might be protected. Id. at 351-52.
10. Id. at 361 (Harlan, I., concurring).
11. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 184 (1984) (holding that a person does not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an open field); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745
(1979) (holding that an individual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding
information given to a third person); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752-54 (1971) (holding
that an individual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when revealing information to
someone with whom he is speaking).
12. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,41-48 (2000) (discussing the vehicle
checkpoint exception as related to public safety); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-72,
376 (1976) (upholding the automobile exception); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol53/iss3/7

2

Cooke: Discretionary Warrantless Searches and Seizures and the Fourth Am
2002]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

between a person's reasonable expectation of privacy in his home and in his
automobile. 13 According to the Court in Carrollv. United States,
[there is] a necessary difference between a search of a store,
dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a proper
official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship,
motor boat, wagon, or automobile, for contraband goods, where
it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought. 4
In Chambers v. Maroney, the Court interpreted Carrollto hold that "a search
warrant [is] unnecessary where there is probable cause to search an automobile
stopped on the highway; the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car's
contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained."' 5
The ChambersCourt followed Carrollandheldthat awarrantless police search
of a vehicle at the police station following the arrest of four men suspected of armed
robbery was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 6 Based on the constitutional
difference between houses and cars, the Court held that a warrantless search of an
automobile was reasonable whenever the police had probable cause to search the
vehicle. 7 Carroll and Chambers established this now well-settled automobile
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement based on automobiles'
mobility, the lessened expectation of privacy to which they are entitled, and the
pervasive government regulation to which they are subject."
2. Police Regulatory Function (Vehicle Checkpoints)
Based on the regulatory authority of the police, the Supreme Court has held that
in certain circumstances routine vehicle checkpoints or roadblocks do not violate
the Fourth Amendment and need not be authorized by judicial warrants." In
determining whether a checkpoint is unreasonable, "the Court has weighed the

(1973) (affirming the warrantless search incident to arrest exception); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 298-99 (1967) (discussing the exigent circumstances exception).
13. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367 ("[T]he inherent mobility of automobiles creates circumstances
of such exigency that, as a practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is
impossible.").
14. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
15. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970).
16. Id. at52.
17. Id. at 51-52.
18. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,367-68 (1976); see also Cardwell v. Lewis,
417 U.S. 583, 592-96 (1974) (holding that where officers had probable cause, impoundment of the
suspect's vehicle and a warrantless examination of its exterior did not violate an expectation of
privacy when the vehicle had been parked in a public place).
19. See Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,455 (1990); United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976).
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public interest against the Fourth Amendment interest of the individual."2 In United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte,the Court held that a fixed-border checkpoint used to
identify illegal aliens did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the need to
control the entrance of illegal immigrants was great, while "the consequent
intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests [was] quite limited."21 Furthermore, the
Court stated that the checkpoint stops could be made without a warrant and without
any reasonable suspicion that the driver or passenger was an illegal alien. 2 The
Court reasoned that the warrantless stops did not violate the Fourth Amendment
because the motorists were only detained briefly, border patrol visually inspected
the vehicle without searching the person or the vehicle, signs indicated an
approaching checkpoint and notified drivers that they would be stopped, and claims
of unreasonableness were subject to judicial review.' Lastly, the Court stated that
the checkpoint could operate without a warrant because the probability that an
officer's discretion would be abused was reduced by the presence
of other officials
24
at the checkpoint and by the routine nature of vehicle stops.
In Martinez-Fuerte, the Supreme Court carefully limited its opinion to
permanent, fixed checkpoints and indicated that its holding did not apply to
"random roving-patrol stops. '25 Similarly, in Delawarev. Prouse,the Court held
that police officers could not use their regulatory powers to randomly stop and
detain a driver for the sole purpose of checking his license and vehicle registration
absent "articulable and reasonable suspicion" that he was unlicensed or that the
vehicle was not registered. 26 The Court stated "that persons in automobiles on
public roadways may not.., have their travel and privacy interfered with at the
unbridled discretion of police officers.

27

Relying on Martinez-Fuerte and distinguishing Prouse, the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of a sobriety checkpoint in Michigan Departmentof
State Policev. Sitz. 2' The Court stated that "[t]he intrusion resulting from the brief
stop at the sobriety checkpoint is for constitutional purposes indistinguishable from
the checkpoint stops we upheld in Martinez-Fuerte."29 As in Martinez-Fuerte,the
Court balanced the public's interest with the level of intrusion on an individual's
privacy to determine the checkpoint's constitutionality. 30 The Court reasoned that
the undisputed problem of drunken driving had a substantial effect on the public,
while the brief detainment of an individual at a sobriety checkpoint intruded only
20. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 555.
21. Id. at 556-57.
22. Id. at 560-67.
23. Id. at 558-59.
24. Id. at 565-66.
25. Id. at 558-59, 566-67. But see United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975)
(holding that random roving-patrol stops did not violate the Fourth Amendment when the stops were
based on an articulable reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contained illegal immigrants).
26. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
27. Id.

28. 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
29. Id. at 453.
30. Id. at451-53.
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slightly on his privacy rights.3 ' To support its decision, the Court contrasted fixed
checkpoint stops, where every car is routinely stopped, with random roving patrol
stops:
[T]he circumstances surrounding a [fixed] checkpoint stop and
search are far less intrusive than those attending a roving-patrol
stop. Roving patrols often operate at night on seldom-traveled
roads, and their approach may frighten motorists. At traffic
checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are being
stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers' authority, and he
32
is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion.
These distinctions, combined with the State's interest, the effectiveness of the
checkpoints, and the minimal intrusion on the individual led the Court to hold that
the fixed sobriety checkpoints did not violate the Fourth Amendment.33
Contrary to its pro-law enforcement decisions in Martinez-Fuerteand Sitz, the
Supreme Court held in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond that Indianapolis's drug
interdiction checkpoint program violated the Fourth Amendment. 34 The Court
declined "to suspend the usual requirement of individualized suspicion where the
police [sought] to employ a checkpoint primarily for the ordinary enterprise of
investigatingcrimes."-' In Edmond, the city of Indianapolis conducted six vehicle
checkpoints between August andNovember 1998 in an effort to detect the presence
of illegal drugs.36 During that time, the officers stopped 1161 vehicles and arrested
104 motorists; 55 of the arrests related to the possession of illegal drugs.37
Following program directives, officers at the checkpoints would stop a group
of vehicles according to a predetermined sequence. 3 An officer would approach the
vehicle, explain the drug checkpoint to the motorist, and ask the driver for a license
and registration.39 Simultaneously, the officer would visually inspect the outside of
the vehicle and its open areas while a narcotics dog walked around the stopped
vehicle.' Officers were not allowed to search the vehicle absent consent or a
reasonable suspicion that the motorist was impaired or that the vehicle contained
illegal drugs.4'

31. Id.
32. Id. at 452-53 (first alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543, 558 (1976)).
33. Id. at455.
34. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,48 (2000).
35. Id. at 44 (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 34-35.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 35.
39. Id.
40. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 35.
41. Id.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2002

5

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53: 641

Two motorists who had been stopped at a checkpoint filed a class-action
lawsuit against the City of Indianapolis on behalf of themselves and all motorists
who had been stopped in the past or could conceivably be stopped in the future at
the Indianapolis checkpoints. 2 The United States District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana held that the checkpoint program did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.43 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's
decision,44 and the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's
holding.
The Court held that the checkpoint in Edmond violated the Fourth Amendment
because its "primary purpose" was the interdiction of narcotics.4 5 The Court
explained that it had "never approved a checkpoint program whose primary purpose
was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing., 46 Further, the Court
reasoned that it "would not credit the 'general interest in crime control' as
justification for a regime of suspicionless stops." 47 Unlike Martinez-Fuerte,where
the checkpoints served to patrol the border for illegal immigration, 4' and Sitz, where
the checkpoints served to eradicate drunk driving,49 the Court reasoned that the
checkpoints in Edmond were too generalized and that upholding them "would
[provide] little check on the ability of the authorities to construct roadblocks for
almost any conceivable law enforcement purpose." 5 Therefore, because the drug
interdiction checkpoint program's general purpose was crime control, the Court
held that it violated the Fourth Amendment."
3. Search Incident to a Lawful WarrantlessArrest
A search and seizure conducted incident to a lawful warrantless arrest is
52
another exception to the Fourth Amendment's general warrant requirement.
Following a lawful warrantless arrest, an officer may search the person arrested and
the area within the arrestee's reach based on the need to seize weapons and to
prevent the destruction of evidence.53 In Chimel v. California,the Supreme Court
held that a warrantless search incident to an arrest was unreasonable because after
the suspect had been arrested, the officers searched his entire home, including the
attic and garage, and eventually seized numerous items.54 The Court concluded that
the search "went far beyond the [arrestee's] person and the area from within which
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 36.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 41-42.
Edmond, 531 U.S. at41.
Id. (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18 (1979)).
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976).
Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990).
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42.
Id. at 42, 48.
See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 760 (1969).
Id. at 762-63.
Id. at 753-54, 768.
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he might have obtained either a weapon or something that could have been used as
evidence against him. There was no constitutional justification, in the absence of
a search warrant, for extending the search beyond that area."" s
A movement toward a bright-line approach to warrantless searches incident to
arrests has emerged in cases where the arrest is made in conjunction with a traffic
violation. s6 In United States v. Robinson, the Supreme Court upheld the
reasonableness of a police officer's search of a driver following the driver's arrest
for operating a motor vehicle without a license. 7 The police officer searched the
driver's pocket, found a cigarette package, and unwrapped an object found inside
the cigarette package which turned out to be heroin. 8 In his dissenting opinion,
Justice Marshall questioned whether the officer had reason to believe that the
cigarette package could have contained any weapons and argued that the search
constituted an abuse of police discretion. 9 However, the majority reasoned that
police officers needed a bright-line rule to follow and concluded that "[a] police
officer's detennination as to how and where to search the person of a suspect whom
he ha[d] arrested [was] necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth
Amendment [did] not require to be broken down in each instance into an analysis
of each step in the search."6
In New York v. Belton, the Supreme Court held that the police may search not
only one's person following a warrantless arrest related to a traffic violation, but
also the passenger compartment of the automobile.6 ' Based on the reasoning in
Chimel, the Court explained that the passenger compartment of an automobile
would be "within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a
weapon or evidentiary ite[m]."' 6 Therefore, the Belton Court held that a police
officer's search of the automobile's passenger compartment did not violate the
Fourth Amendment.63 According to the Court, the searches were lawfulbecause the
driver's traffic violation justified the stop.6 Additionally, once the officer smelled
marijuana, he had probable cause to arrest the men for narcotics possession.6 s
55. Id. at 768.
56. See, for example, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973), where the Court
stated that
[t]he authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while
based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on
what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation
that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect.
57. Id. at 220-23, 236; see also Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 262, 265 (1973) (holding
that a warrantless search incident to an arrest for operating a motor vehicle without a license was
reasonable even though police regulations did not require the officer to take the driver into custody
and police policy did not require a full-body search of the person incident to the arrest).
58. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 222-23.
59. Id. at 241, 255-56 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 235.
61. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,460 (1981).
62. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)).
63. Id. at 462-63.
64. Id. at461.
65. Id. at 455.
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A police officer's discretion to search a person and the passenger compartment
of an automobile incident to a warrantless arrest does not change based on the
officer's motivations for the arrest.66 Justice Scalia, writing the opinion for a
unanimous Court in Whren v. United States, reasoned that the Court "described
Robinson as having established that 'the fact that the officer does not have the state
of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification
for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action."'6 7
The events described in Whren occurred in a "high drug area" of the District
of Columbia. 8 The police officer passed a truck with a temporary license plate
which was being driven by a young man who was looking down into the lap of the
passenger in the front seat.69 When the officer made a U-turn to drive toward the
truck, the driver quickly turned to the right and "sped off."70 After catching up with
the young men, the officer approached the vehicle and spotted two bags of crack
cocaine in the passenger's lap.7 The officer arrested the two men and seized various
illegal drugs from the vehicle.72
At a pretrial suppression hearing, the petitioners argued that the drugs should
be inadmissible because the police officer had made a "pretextual" stop
unsupported by probable cause.73 The petitioners further claimed that the test of
reasonableness should be "whether the officer's conduct deviated materially from
usual police practices, so that a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would
not have made the stop for the reasons given."'" The Court refused to apply this test
due to its subjective nature (notwithstanding its objective language) and instead
stated that "the Fourth Amendment's concern with 'reasonableness' allows certain
actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent."75
Therefore, the Court held that since the officer had probable cause to search the
petitioners for a traffic violation, the stop was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.76 Furthermore, when the officer viewed the illegal drugs in the
passenger's lap, the Court held that he acted appropriately in arresting the young
men and in seizing the evidence.77
The Court applied the Whren holding to a minor, fine-only offense in Atwater
v. City ofLago Vista.78 InAtwater, decided on April 24,2001, Gail Atwater and her

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
Id. (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)).
Id. at 808.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 808-09.
Whren, 517 U.S. at 809.
Id.
Id. at 814.
Id.
Id. at 819.
See id.
532 U.S. 318, 353-54 (2001).
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husband filed suit against the City of Lago Vista under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 79 The
Atwaters claimed that Gail's warrantless arrest for the misdemeanor charges of
driving without her seatbelt, failing to secure her children in seatbelts, and driving
without a license and proof of insurance was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.8" A majority of the Court affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals and held that Atwater's arrest was "not so extraordinary as to
violate the Fourth Amendment."8'
InAtwater, Officer Turek pulled Atwater over for seatbelt violations.82 Officer
Turek asked to see Atwater's license and registration, as required by state law, and
Atwater replied that she did not have the paperwork because her purse had been
stolen the day before. The officer placed Atwater under arrest, prevented her from
taking her children anywhere, and took her into police custody, where she remained
in a jail cell for about one hour."
Atwater argued that her warrantless arrest for a fine-only misdemeanor was an
unreasonable seizure because the police officer did not encounter a threat of
violence and she had not committed a felony. 85 After examining a lengthy history
of the common law concerning an officer's arrest authority pursuant to a
misdemeanor not amounting to a "breach of the peace," Justice Souter, writing for
the majority, stated:
Atwater has cited no particular evidence that those who framed
and ratified the Fourth Amendment sought to limit peace officers'
warrantless misdemeanor arrest authority to instances of actual
breach of the peace, and our own review of the recent and
respected compilations of framing-era documentary history has
likewise failed to reveal any such design.86
In addition, the Court rejected Atwater's proposal for a modem test that would
forbid a warrantless arrest "when conviction could not ultimately carry anyjail time
87
and when the government show[ed] no compelling need for immediate detention.
Justice Souter explained that the Fourth Amendment was not well-served by a caseby-case approach to determining reasonableness. 8 Souter further stated that

79. Id. at 325.
80. Id. at 323-25.

81. Id. at 355.
82. Id. at 324. Officer Turek was familiar with Atwater from a prior stop during which he had
warned her about the unsafe seating position of her child on the vehicle's armrest. Id. at 324 n.1.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 324.
Atwater, 532 U.S. at 324.
Id. at 326-27.
Id. at 336.
Id. at 346.

88. Id. at 347.
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the Fourth Amendment has to be applied on the spur (and in the heat)
of the moment, and the object in implementing its command of
reasonableness is to draw standards sufficiently clear and simple to be
applied with a fair prospect of surviving judicial second-guessing
months and years after an arrest or search is made.89
In short, the Court held that the arrest of Gail Atwater was not unreasonable and did
not violate her Fourth Amendment rights because Officer Turek had probable cause
to believe Atwater had committed a traffic violation, he was authorized to make a
custodial arrest, and he made the arrest in an ordinary manner.9"
4. Police CaretakingFunction (Automobile Inventory)
In cases of abandoned vehicles, automobile accidents, or traffic violations
leading to arrests, government officials have the authority, "as part of what the
Court has called 'community caretaking functions,''. to impound the vehicle and
to take an inventory of its contents.92 Police departments develop and follow
routine procedures in order to meet the needs of the inventory search, namely, "the
protection of the owner's property while it remains in police custody; the protection
of the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property; and the

89. Id.
90. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354-55.
91. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,368 (1976) (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413
U.S. 433, 441 (1973)). Under the police caretaking function, another exception to the general warrant
rule exists where "exigent circumstances" necessitate action regardless of a person's reasonable
expectation of privacy. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967); cf. John F. Decker,
Emergency Circumstances,PoliceResponses, andFourthAmendment Restrictions,89 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 433,457-510 (1999) (proposing that pursuant to the police caretaking function, other
emergency situations, such as children in danger, the odor ofa dead body, or the presence ofexplosive
devices or volatile chemicals, create a separate category of exception to the Fourth Amendment
outside of the exigent circumstances exception). The Warden Court held that warrantless searches or
seizures were reasonable when "'the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative."'
Warden, 387 U.S. at 298 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,456 (1948)). The Court
further stated that "[t]he Fourth Amendment [did] not require police officers to delay in the course of
an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others." Id. at 298-99.
In Welsh v. Wisconsin, the Court questioned the scope of the exigent circumstances exception and
noted that "police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might
justify warrantless searches or arrests." Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740,749-50 (1984). The Court
held that a police officer's warrantless entry into the suspect's home violated the Fourth Amendment
because the suspect had committed only a minor offense. Id. at 750. The Court reasoned that while
the exigent circumstances exception could be employed in cases of violent crimes, threats of violence,
hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, or destruction of evidence, a minor offense absent these characteristics
would not justify using the exception. Id. at 749-52. In sum, the Court believed that "[w]hen an officer
undertakes to act as his own magistrate, he ought to be in a position to justify it by pointing to some
real immediate and serious consequences if he postponed action to get a warrant." Id. at 751 (quoting
McDonald, 335 U.S. at 460).
92. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 368-69.
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protection of the police from potential danger."'93 In South Dakotav. Opperman,the
Supreme Court held that a lawful impoundment of an automobile and a subsequent
warrantless search did not violate the Fourth Amendment when police followed
standard procedures and the automobile contained valuables, which could plainly
be seen from outside the automobile.94 In the Court's view, the police conductedthe
search for the lawful purpose of taking an inventory of the automobile's contents,
which was consistent with the established needs of the inventory search.9"
When police conduct an inventory search based on their administrative,
caretaking function, the search may be reasonable even absent probable cause.9" In
Colorado v. Bertine, a police officer performed an inventory search of a van after
arresting its owner for driving under the influence of alcohol.97 The officer
conducted the search after taking the man into custody and before moving the van
from the site.9 During the search, the officer found a backpack containing metal
canisters, and the canisters held cocaine and cocaine paraphernalia. 99 The Court
upheld the search as reasonable because the officer followed standard procedures
and there was no evidence that he "acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of
investigation."'0 0 The Court concluded that "reasonable police regulations relating
to inventory procedures administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment,
even though courts might as a matter of hindsight be able to devise equally
reasonable rules requiring a different procedure.'' °
However, an inventory search is not reasonable when a police department fails
to adopt detailed procedures to follow when conducting the search. 2 The
reasonableness of an inventory search turns on whether the officer used judgment
constrained by standard police procedures or whether he acted with unchecked
discretion solely on the suspicion of a crime.0 3
In Floridav. Wells, the Supreme Court held that a police officer's inventory
search violated the Fourth Amendment because the Florida Police Department did
not have a specific inventory policy regarding the opening of closed containers.' 4
In Wells, the police officer arrested the petitioner for driving under the influence.' 5
After impounding the driver's car, the officer conducted an inventory search and

93. Id. at 369 (citations omitted).
94. Id. at 366, 375-76.
95. Id. at 375-76.
96. See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367,371 (1987) ("The probable-cause approach is
unhelpful when analysis centers upon the reasonableness of routine administrative caretaking
functions, particularly when no claim is made that the protective procedures are a subterfuge for
criminal investigations." (quoting Opperman, 428 U.S. at 370 n.5)).
97. Id. at 368-69.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 369.
100. Id. at 372.
101. Id. at 374 (footnote omitted).
102. See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 3-5 (1990).
103. Id. at 3-4.
104. Id. at 4-5.
105. Id. at2.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2002

11

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53: 641

uncovered two marijuana cigarette butts in the ashtray and a locked suitcase in the
trunk. 0 6 After the suitcase was forced open, it revealed a garbage bag containing
marijuana. 10 7 In holding that the search violated the Fourth Amendment, the Court
reasoned as follows: "Our view that standardized criteria or established routine
must regulate the opening of containers found during inventory searches is based
on the principle that an inventory search must not be a ruse for a general
rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence."' ' Based on the Court's
holding, inventory searches are reasonable when they have a caretaking purpose
and when they are implemented according to standard police procedures."
III. ANALYSIS
A. InterpretativeInconsistencies
The Supreme Court's past decisions addressing the reasonableness of searches
and seizures have been fairly consistent and have helped to define the scope of the
Fourth Amendment. However, the theories behind the Court's most recent decisions
in Edmond and Atwater seem to contradict each other and to muddy the waters
rather than to provide clear guidance. 1 ° The source of the problem is that police are
authorized to enforce traffic laws (regulatory function) in addition to criminal laws
(investigatory function), but there is no distinction between the powers that the
police may exercise when performing one function versus the other."' In Edmond,
for example, the Court prohibited the police from using their regulatory authority
to operate a vehicle checkpoint when the checkpoint served as a means of
interdicting narcotics, or in other words, when the checkpoint was used as a way to
investigate criminal activity.1 2 However, in Atwater, the Court allowed a police
officer to use his regulatory power to arrest Ms. Atwater for a traffic violation, and
this arrest gave the officer the authority to perform an investigatory search pursuant
to either the search incident to an arrest doctrine or to the inventory caretaking
function." 3 These holdings seem to state that a police officer cannot stop multiple
automobiles at a checkpoint when several officers are present and discretion is least
likely to be abused; 14 however, a single officer can stop an individual driver for a
violation of a minor traffic regulation, and if the officer suspects criminal activity,
he has the authority to arrest the individual and to conduct a search ofthe occupants
and of the passenger area of the automobile."'

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Wells, 495 U.S. at 4 (citations omitted).
Id. at 4-5.
See supra notes 1-4, 34-51, 78-90 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.

112.
113.
114.
115.

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,42 (2000).
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354-55 (2001); see supra Part 11.B.3-4.
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 35.
Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354-55.
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The problems associated with distinguishing between proper police actions in
the performance of different police functions also arise in comparing Whren and
Atwater. Whren clearly held that while police officers were performing a regulatory
function, they were authorized to stop a driver for a traffic violation (regardless of
the officers' motivations), and the officers were further authorized to arrest the6
driver and the passenger after they viewed the narcotics in the vehicle."
Additionally, following the arrests, the police officers were permitted to search the
suspects as well as the suspects' automobile." 7 In one swift chain of events, the
police officers' regulatory authority facilitated their investigatory function.
This chain of events could have been even more exaggerated. For example, in
Atwater, the police officer was authorized to stop Ms. Atwater for violating a minor,
fine-only seatbelt law."8 Using this violation to assert his discretion, the officer
arrested Atwater." 9 Based on the holding in Whren and on the search incident to an
arrest doctrine, the officer could have used his regulatory authority to investigate
Atwater for any suspected criminal activity.2 For example, suppose the officer
suspected that Ms. Atwater shoplifted food from a local grocery, but he did not
have probable cause to obtain a search warrant. Pursuant to Whren andAtwater,the
officer could wait until he caught Ms. Atwater committing a traffic violation, arrest
2
her for the violation, and then search her vehicle for the stolen items.1 '
Furthermore, the officer could impound Atwater's car following the arrest and use
his authority under the caretaking function to inventory the vehicle's contents,
thereby allowing him to search more extensively for the stolen items and to
simultaneously investigate any other possible criminal activity."
This hypothetical scenario illustrates that police officers' authorized actions do
not vary according to their functions. If a police department had a written policy
directing officers to use their regulatory authority to investigate suspected
individuals for criminal activity based on less than probable cause, courts would be
quick to label it unconstitutional.123However, absent a written policy, the Court has
allowed police officers to circumvent the warrant requirement based on the search
incident to an arrest doctrine, regardless of the type of arrest or of the police
function performed. 4

116. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 819 (1996).
117. Id. at 819.
118. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 323-26.
119. Id. at 323-24.
120. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (holding that the police may
search a motorist and the passenger compartment of his automobile following a warrantless arrest
related to a traffic violation).
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368-72 (1976) (upholding the
authorized impoundment of vehicles pursuant to the police caretaking function).
123. See supra notes 34-51 and accompanying text
124. See supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
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B. CustodialArrestfor a Minor Traffic Violation

In United States v. Robinson, the Court stated that the justification for a search
incident to an arrest rests "on the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him
into custody" and "on the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use at
trial."' 25 One could argue that an individual like the defendant in Robinson waives
26
his privacy rights when he commits a crime such as possession of narcotics.'

However, this reasoning fails when applied to the Atwater case. It is difficult to
understand how a person's failure to secure his seatbelt could ever be considered
a waiver of his right to privacy. The Robinson Court held that
[i]t is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority
to search, and ... in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full

search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant
but is also a "reasonable"
requirement of the Fourth Amendment,
27
search under that Amendment. 1

This reasoning makes sense for situations in which the police are acting in an
investigatory capacity. Obviously, when police are enforcing criminal laws pursuant
to their investigatory function, they are more likely to encounter weapons or
contraband, so the need to search is greater. However, the reasonableness of the
search incident to an arrest in Atwater is questionable when it is justified based on
the officer's regulatory authority.
Furthermore, Ms. Atwater's arrest, or any custodial arrest for a relatively minor
traffic violation, cannot be justified by the government's interest in crime control.
According to one commentator, "[g]ovemmental interests in custodial arrests
include: 1) insuring the presence of the suspect to answer the charges against him
or her; 2) obtaining evidence of the crime of which the suspect is accused; 3)
preventing future harm; 4) providing certain social service functions; and 5)
maintaining the proper respect for law and the police."'2 8For the majority of trafficviolation stops, these governmental interests do not justify a custodial arrest.' 29 The
only instance in which a custodial arrest is warranted is in the case ofan intoxicated
driver. 3 In almost every other situation, the government's interest in enforcing
traffic regulations will be satisfied by issuing a citation and by fining the driver for
the violation.'

125. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973).
126. See supranotes 57-58 and accompanying text.
127. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
128. Barbara C. Salken, The General Warrantof the Twentieth Century?A FourthAmendment
Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Arrestfor Traffic Offenses, 62 TEMP. L. REv. 221, 266 (1989)
(footnotes omitted).
129. Id. at 274.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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C. Minor Traffic Violations As Criminal Offenses
Most jurisdictions generally classify traffic violations as a criminal offense,
even though traffic violations merely involve the violation of a state regulation."'
As states developed professional police forces, legislatures increased government
officials' arrest power.' One author explains the legislatures' treatment of traffic
violations as follows:
Without considering whether the taking ofimmediate custody was
necessary, legislatures began to authorize custodial arrests for
minor crimes. This change appears to have been aimed at making
it easier to arrest without a warrant, but the effect was to authorize
custodial arrests for many offenses, "such as ordinance and
that had previously not been subject to
regulatory violations,
134
arrest at all.'
This treatment of traffic violations as crimes gives police the discretionary
authority, absent a statutory provision prohibiting a custodial arrest, to arrest a
motorist for a minor traffic offense; this arrest in turn gives police officers the
discretionary authority to search the13 driver and the automobile pursuant to the
search incident to an arrest doctrine.
D. Police Discretion
In examining police functions in conjunction with the common law and in
trying to reconcile Edmond and Atwater, one must question whether police
discretion should be limited or whether officers should have broad discretion to aid
in efficient crime control. According to the United States Supreme Court, "[t]he
essential purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a
standard of 'reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion by government
officials, including law enforcement agents, in order "to safeguard the privacy and

132. 7A AM. JuR. 2D Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 244 (1997).
133. Salken, supra note 128, at 258-59.
134. Id. at 259 (footnotes omitted) (quoting FLOYD FEENEY, THE POLICE AND PRETRIAL RELEASE

11(1982)).
135. See supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text. One could argue that traffic violations
should be handled quite differently than criminal offenses. A separately designated group of
government officials couldbe solely responsible for issuing traffic citations. For example, most states
monitor truck weight loads on state highways in a similar fashion. 7A AM. JUR. 2D Automobiles and
Highway Traffic §§ 242-43 (1997). States have the power "to enact statutes empowering police or
otherdesignatedofficers to inspect motor vehicles to detect inadequacy of equipment, overloading,
and other violations of the law relating to the equipment, size and weight of motor vehicles." Id.
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). "In order to enforce statutory provisions relative to the weight
and load of motor vehicles, designated officials may be empowered to stop apparently overloaded
vehicles to ascertain their exact weight." Id. § 243 (footnote omitted).
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security of individuals against arbitrary invasions.... ,136 In Edmond, the Court
limited the discretion of police officers in cases involving checkpoints by
explaining:
If we were to rest the case at this high level of generality, there
would be little check on the ability of the authorities to construct
roadblocks for almost any conceivable law enforcement purpose.
Without drawing [this] line..., the Fourth Amendment would do
little to prevent37such intrusions from becoming a routine part of
American life.
Likewise, Prouseheld that "persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for
that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at the unbridled
discretion of police officers."' 38
However, Atwater allows exactly what Edmond prohibits. Atwater enables
police officers to stop drivers for any conceivable regulatory purpose, thus
providing little check on the officers' discretion. 39 When Atwater's outcome is
viewed in light of the Court's holding in Whren-that the police officer's
motivation for stopping a driver for a traffic violation should not be considered as
long as the officer had probable cause to make the stop 4' -it is clear that problems
such as pretextual stops and racial profiling may increase considerably. One
commentator proposes that
[t]he sort of abuses recently documented can be remedied, in
part, by limiting the officer's power to decide which offender to
stop.... Limiting the power to search for drugs absent suspicion
removes the incentive for police to elect one offender for
prosecution because societal prejudices and stereotypes lead him
to believe the bounty will far exceed the offense he instantly
observes. Decisions about how to enforce traffic laws will then
turn on questions about how traffic laws ought to be enforced
instead of inarticulable hunches and demographic profiles that
subject perfectly innocent Americans to invasions of privacy and
the denial of dignity.' 4'

136. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (second alteration in original) (footnote
omitted) (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978)).
137. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,42 (2000).
138. Prouse,440 U.S. at 663.
139. See supra notes 78-90 and accompanying text.
140. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
141. Wesley MacNeil Oliver, With an Evil Eye and an UnequalHand: PretextualStops and
DoctrinalRemedies to RacialProfiling, 74 TuL. L. REv. 1409, 1480-81 (2000).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol53/iss3/7

16

Cooke: Discretionary Warrantless Searches and Seizures and the Fourth Am
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53: 641

regarding the scope of police authority. For example, South Carolina Code section
16-25-70 limits the police's authority to search for evidence in a suspect's home
following an arrest for domestic abuse. Section 16-25-70(H) provides that "[n]o
evidence other than evidence of violations of this article found as a result of a
'
warrantless search is admissible in a court of law."149
This statute authorizes police
entry into a suspect's residence and permits a warrantless arrest of an individual for
criminal domestic violence where an officer has probable cause to believe that such
5 However, the statute effectively limits
action is necessary to prevent further harm."'
police action to the criminal violation at issue instead of allowing officers to use the
domestic abuse violation to facilitate further criminal investigation.'5 '
South Carolina's 2001 Session Laws also serve as a model for providing clear
guidelines to police officers regarding proper searches and seizures pursuant to seat
belt violations. South Carolina Code section 56-5-6525 was amended to provide
that
[t]he Department of Public Safety or any other law enforcement
agency must not use a "Click It or Ticket" campaign or a similar
endeavor of systematic checkpoints or roadblocks as a law
enforcement tool where the principal purpose is to detect and
issue a ticket to a violator of the provisions of this article on either
a primary or secondary basis.' 2
Furthermore, section 56-5-6540(F) provides that "[n]o vehicle, driver, or occupant
in a vehicle may be searched solely because of a violation" of the mandatory seat
belt provision.' These recent amendments should serve as the first step in making
the complicated search-and-seizure procedures more clear and less likely to create
inconsistent outcomes. s4In addition, they should serve as a model for other states
to begin a similar clarification process.
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States has a rich history of cases interpreting the Fourth
Amendment as it relates to warrantless police searches and seizures. In order to

148. S.C. CODEANN. § 16-25-70(H) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 2000).

149. Id.
150. Id. § 16-25-70(A)-(C).
151. Id. § 16-25-70(H1).
152. 2001 S.C. Acts No. 65, § 3 (effective June 28, 2001).

153. Id. § 5(F).
154. These amendments relate to Article I, section 10 ofthe South Carolina Constitution, which
gives South Carolina citizens an added protection against invasions of privacy. See S.C. CONST. art.
I, § 10. Article I, section 10 protects citizens against "unreasonable searches and seizures and
unreasonable invasions of privacy," whereas the Fourth Amendment does not include protection
against unreasonable invasions of privacy. Id. (emphasis added); see supra notes 7-8 and
accompanying text.
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E. Bright-Line Rule v. Case-by-CaseBasis
Several inconsistencies between the cases stem from the struggle between the
need for a bright-line rule that would allow police officers to be effective without
a court second guessing their actions and the countervailing need for an approach
by which fairness could be determined from examining the facts and circumstances
of each particular case. In Atwater, Justice Souter stated "that a responsible Fourth
Amendment balance is not well served by standards requiring sensitive, case-bycase determinations of government need, lest every discretionary judgment in the
field be converted into an occasion for constitutional review."' 42 By contrast, in
Opperman, ChiefJustice Burgerreasoned that "' [t]he relevant [Fourth Amendment]
test... [is] the reasonableness of the seizure under all the circumstances. The test
of reasonableness cannot be fixed byper se rules; each case must be decided on its
own facts.""' 4 3 Despite the Court's approach in Opperman, the most recent cases
exhibit the Court's tendency to seek a bright-line solution for determining
reasonableness.'"
F. ProposedSolution
The inherent difficulties in determining how a police officer should act in
performing different police functions could be ameliorated with state legislation.
Adopting state legislation would also create a bright-line "rule" approach without
giving police officers unlimited discretion. One author suggests that "[i]f law
enforcement officers are limited in their authority to those practices that are
authorized, defined, and limited by state law, such enabling state law may provide
adequate bases for assuring that this authority is exercised in a consistent
manner."' In Atwater, for example, the Court discussed the power of state
legislatures either to impose restrictions on warrantless arrests or to authorize
warrantless arrests in certain limited situations. 146 Justice Souter reasoned that "[i]t
is ... easier to devise a minor-offense limitation by statute than to derive one
through the Constitution, simply because the statute can let the arrest power turn on
any sort of practical consideration without having to subsume it under a broader
principle."'4 7
Courts should not have to decide these issues; the legislature is the more
appropriate setting for discussing police discretion and for making decisions

142. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001).
143. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 373 (1976) (quoting Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,509-10 (1971)).
144. See, e.g., Whren, 517 U.S. at 813, 819 (holding that despite an officer's subjective
motivations, a stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the officer has probable cause to
believe that a traffic violation has occurred).
145. George E. Dix, FourthAmendment Federalism: The PotentialRequirementof State Law
Authorizationfor Law Enforcement Activity, 14 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 19 (1987).
146. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 343-45, 352.

147. Id. at 352.
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determine the validity of a search, the Supreme Court has historically balanced the
need for efficient and effective government involvement in crime control against
the need to protect individuals from unreasonable invasions of privacy.'55 In an
effort to address the reasonableness of government action, the Court has developed
several exceptions to the general rule against warrantless searches and seizures
presented by the Fourth Amendment.' 6 Although these exceptions appropriately
give police authority to act when certain situations demand their involvement, the
most recent Supreme Court cases address these exceptions inconsistently. As this
Comment discusses, in Edmond, the police were prohibited from using their
discretionary regulatory authority to investigate individuals for narcotics possession
in a checkpoint situation; 7 by contrast, in Atwater, the police were allowed to use
this same discretionary authority to arrest the motorist for a minor fine-only traffic
violation. ' These cases illustrate the inconsistencies between police officers'
authority in differing circumstances. These inconsistencies present questions that
demand examination.
State involvement through legislation provides the best way to improve
consistency, precision, and predictability in the area of warrantless police searches
and seizures, particularly those involving automobiles. South Carolina has taken
this first step with its criminal domestic violence statute and with its recent
amendments concerning seat belt laws. In discussing this issue, state legislatures
should consider the differences between the three police functions (regulatory,
investigatory, and caretaking), the treatment of traffic violations as criminal
offenses, the role of police discretion as it relates to the Fourth Amendment and to
the individual state's constitution, and whether certain situations require a brightline rule or a case-by-case approach. With further state involvement, courts will not
be forced to walk the fine line of limiting police discretion to ensure individual
privacy while simultaneously attempting to allow police discretion to ensure
effective crime control. The legislature is a better forum for addressing these
complicated issues due to its ability to conduct thorough research and to consider
community input.
JenniferIson Cooke

155.
156.
157.
158.

See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
See supra Part Il.B.
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000).
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354-55 (2001).
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